In the Interest of K.M.L., a Child

Summary

The Texas Supreme Court held that an intellectually disabled mother's affidavit of voluntary relinquishment was admissible—both because it satisfied Family Code § 161.103(a)(3)'s verification requirement and because the later guardianship adjudication had no retroactive effect—but that legally insufficient evidence supported the jury's finding that she knowingly and intelligently executed it, while the evidence legally supported the best-interest finding. The Court further held that the father, who answered pro se but received no notice of the permanency hearings or of trial, did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his due-process right to notice by appearing at trial under subpoena, rendering the termination judgment as to him void. It reversed the court of appeals' judgment, remanding to that court for factual-sufficiency review of the remaining termination grounds as to the mother and to the trial court for a new trial as to the father. Justice Johnson, joined by Justice Boyd, dissented in part, contending the evidence legally supported the relinquishment finding as to the mother; Justice Lehrmann, joined by Justice Devine, concurred, agreeing with the result as to the mother but concluding the father waived the notice defect and would instead reverse for the trial court's failure to admonish him of his statutory right to appointed counsel.