Ex Parte Cranman

Summary

On rehearing, the Supreme Court of Alabama withdrew its earlier opinion and restated the doctrine of State-agent immunity, confining personal-capacity immunity to five categories of conduct - formulating plans, policies, or designs; exercising judgment in administering a department or agency of government; discharging duties in the manner prescribed by statute, rule, or regulation; exercising judgment in enforcing the criminal laws; and exercising judgment in releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing persons of unsound mind, or educating students - subject to exceptions where governing law requires liability or the agent acts willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of law. Grounding its analysis in Ala. Const. art. I, § 13's right to a remedy, art. I, § 14, and art. III, § 43's separation of powers, the court held that the express remedy guarantee for suits against individuals stands above implications drawn from § 14 and that immunity must rest on constitutional provisions rather than judicial declarations of sound public policy. Applying the restated rule, the court held that University of Alabama physicians who treated Matthew Cranman at the student health center exercised medical rather than governmental discretion and were not entitled to State-agent immunity, and it reversed the Court of Civil Appeals' affirmance of summary judgment and remanded. Justices Johnstone, Cook, and Brown concurred in the judgment (Cook viewing the restated rule as dicta and disputing any § 14 basis for discretionary-function immunity), while Justices Maddox and See dissented.