Gregory Dean Banister, Petitioner v. Lorie Davis

Summary

The Supreme Court held that a timely Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion to alter or amend a federal habeas court's judgment is not a 'second or successive' habeas application under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), but is instead part and parcel of the prisoner's first habeas proceeding. Because a Rule 59(e) motion suspends the finality of the habeas judgment and the 30-day appeal clock runs from the order disposing of it, Banister's appeal was timely and the Fifth Circuit erred in dismissing it as untimely after construing his motion as a successive petition. The Court reasoned that historical habeas practice (per Browder) and AEDPA's purposes both support treating Rule 59(e) motions as components of the initial application, and that Gonzalez v. Crosby's treatment of Rule 60(b) motions does not govern because the two rules differ in historical origin, permissible timing, and appellate effect. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, arguing that a Rule 59(e) motion asserting a habeas claim functions as a second or successive petition under Gonzalez and does not toll the appeal deadline.