Cameron v. Lang; Williams v. Solomon

Summary

Affirming both decisions under review, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that state courts must treat a government employee's qualified immunity from personal liability as the threshold issue, ahead of causation under OCGA § 40-6-6, because immunity protects independent judgment and spares officials the risks of trial. Both officers acted discretionally in deciding to initiate or continue high-speed pursuits without evidence of malice or intent to injure, so both enjoyed official immunity; allegations that Solomon ran a stop sign without siren or lights raised only factual questions of due regard, not ministerial-act liability. Extending Gilbert, the Court held that municipalities, like counties, may be liable for an employee's negligent job performance to the extent governmental immunity was waived by purchasing motor-vehicle liability insurance, leaving Savannah immune (no insurance) but exposing Peach County's sheriff within policy limits. Because evidence construed most favorably to Lang showed a genuine issue of material fact whether Deputy Cameron acted with reckless disregard for proper law enforcement procedures in continuing the pursuit, the Court affirmed the reversal of summary judgment under § 40-6-6(d)(2)'s reckless-disregard proximate-cause standard, which had legislatively replaced the negligence standard of Mixon.